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THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANTITRUST ACT: A




IN 1978 THE United States Supreme Court held for the
first time, in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co.,' that municipalities do not enjoy a blanket exemption
from the coverage of the federal antitrust laws. Although
a majority of the Justices agreed that Congress had in-
tended to exempt some conduct of local governments
under the antitrust laws,2 there was no majority support
for either of the two proposed formulations of the exemp-
tion.3 It was not until 1982, in Community Communications
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
This article is taken from a larger work-in-progress that deals with a number of
the questions - some of which are identified infra note 18 - that have been left
unresolved by the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984. While preparing this
article for publication in the Faculty issue of. the Journal, I have had the benefit of
discussions with my colleagues Matthew Finkin, Jeffrey Gaba' and Paul Rogers. In
addition, Sara Beth Watson, a 1985 graduate of the Southern Methodist Univer-
sity School of Law, provided invaluable research and editorial assistance.
435 U.S. 389 (1978).
2 Justice Brennan delivered the opinion for the Court, writing for himself and
Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens. ChiefJustice Burger concurred in the re-
sult and in Part I of the plurality opinion, thus providing majority support for the
rejection of the cities' "implicit [contention] that, apart from the question of their
exemption as agents of the state under the Parker doctrine, Congress never in-
tended to subject local governments to the antitrust laws." Id. at 394. Justice
Marshall wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Stewart wrote a dissenting
opinion in which Justices White, Rehnquist, and (except as to Part II-B) Blackmun
joined, and Justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
3 Writing for the plurality, Justice Brennan "conclude[d] that the Parker doc-
trine [see Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)] exempts only anticompetitive con-
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Co. v. City of Boulder,4 that the Court agreed on the require-
ments for state-action exemption for municipalities: a
state acting in its sovereign capacity is immune from the
antitrust laws under Parker v. Brown,5 while a local govern-
ment is immune if it acts "in furtherance or implementa-
tion of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy." 6
duct engaged in as an act of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its
subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation on
monopoly public service." 435 U.S. at 413. ChiefJustice Burger appeared to in-
sist that immunity exists only when the municipality's "activity is required by the
State acting as sovereign," 435 U.S. at 425 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975)) (emphasis in original), and "the implied exemp-
tion from federal law 'was necessary in order to make the regulatory Act work,
"and even then only to the extent necessary,' .... 435 U.S. at 426 (quoting Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 597 (1976)).
4 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
5 The Court first held that under certain circumstances states are exempt from
the antitrust laws in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The details of the
Parker doctrine were developed with some difficulty in a series of cases that con-
sidered their applicability to a variety of public and private conduct. E.g., Califor-
nia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 455 U.S. 96 (1980);
New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 97 (1978); Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579
(1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Schwegmann Bros. v.
Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). Analyses of the economic and anti-
trust implications of these decisions may be found in the extensive commentary
on the Parker doctrine. See, e.g., Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After
Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REV. 435 (1981); Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of
Federalism, 26 J. L. & EcON. 23 (1983); Lester, Municipal Liability After Boulder, 36
OxLA. L. REV. 827 (1983); Rogers, Municipal Antitrust Liability in a Federalist System,
1980 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 305; Rogers, The State Action Antitrust Immunity, 49 U. COLO. L.
REV. 147 (1978); Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker
v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 328 (1975).
6 Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982).
In Boulder, the Court held that the legislature's grant of home-rule powers to a
municipality was such a general and broad grant of authority that it could not be
characterized as clearly articulating and affirmatively expressing any specific state
policy. In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985), the Court
concluded that Wisconsin's statute granting authority to cities to construct and
maintain sewage systems and to refuse to serve unannexed areas satisfied the
Boulder test. Specifically, the legislature clearly contemplated that municipalities
would engage in anticompetitive conduct such as that alleged in Hallie, i.e., the
tying of sewage treatment services to the provision of sewage collection and trans-
portation services. Both Hallie and Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference,
Inc. v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1721 (1985), represent major advances in the
Court's treatment of the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown. Both cases
provide examples of state statutes that satisfy the Midcal-Boulder requirement of a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed "state policy favoring anticompeti-
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A wave of antitrust litigation against local governments
followed the City of Lafayette decision, one that became
larger and more menacing - at least from the point of
view of the municipalities - after Boulder, although hard
figures showing the extent of post-Lafayette and post-Boul-
der antitrust claims are difficult to come by. The "1981
Annual Report to the National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers" discusses forty-three pending antitrust cases
against local governments.7 In March 1982, the National
Journal reported that "70 or more" antitrust actions had
been brought against local governments. 8 And in a state-
ment before the Senate Judiciary Committee little more
than a year later, a representative of the United States
Conference of Mayors testified that 200 to 300 antitrust
cases were then pending against local governments. 9
The response of local governments to this new litiga-
tion and to the Supreme Court's decisions was a two-year
lobbying effort that culminated in the signing of Public
Law No. 98-544, the Local Government Antitrust Act of
1984 ("Act"), in October 1984.10 Unlike bills introduced
during the 98th Congress that would have adjusted the
Court's activity-oriented exemption standard,"1 the Act
tive conduct." See Halie, 105 S. Ct. at 1717-19; Southern Motor Carriers, 105 S. Ct.
at 1730-31. The cases also make it clear that state "compulsion" is not required
in order to confer immunity on either public or private actors, see Hallie, 105 S. Ct.
at 1719-20; Southern Motor Carriers, 105 S. Ct. at 1727-30, and Hallie definitively
confirms the implicit, though well-hidden, message in earlier Supreme Court
cases that active state supervision is not an element of the immunity for munici-
palities, 105 S. Ct. 1720-21. Consideration of these issues, however, is beyond the
scope of this article.
7 See Local Government Antitrust Liability: The Boulder Decision: Hearings on the Liabil-
ity of Local Governments Under the Antitrust Laws Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong. 2d Sess. 149-52 (1982) (summary of results of NIMLO survey on
antitrust).
8 See Stanfield, Cities and Countries Ask Congress: Save Us from the Antitrust Laws,
NAT'LJ. 558 (March 12, 1982).
i See Municipal Antitrust Liability: Hearings on S. 1578 Before the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1984) (statement of William J. Althaus) (copy
on file with JOURNAL OF AIR LAW & COMMERCE).
lo 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2750.
1 Eleven bills were introduced during the 98th Congress to immunize, to vary-
ing degrees, local governments from liability under the antitrust laws. H.R. 6027
(as reported out of Committee of Conference, October 10, 1984), see H.R. Rep.
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focuses instead on limiting the remedy that may be as-
sessed against a local governmental defendant.' 2 Section
3(a) of the Act, for example, provides that "[n]o damages,
interest on damages, costs, or attorney's fees may be re-
No. 1158, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 6027 (as amended and passed by the
House, August 8, 1984); H.R. 6027, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 5993, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 1578 (Calendar No. 997), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984);
H.R. 5992, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 5573, 98th Cong., 2d Sess (1984);
H.R. 3368, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1578, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1983);
H.R. 3361, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 2981, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
Most of the bills proposed to immunize local governments for certain activities by
attempting to define the class of activities as to which immunity would apply.
Some attempted to describe the type of conduct to which exemption would apply.
See, e.g., H.R. 5992, supra (local government not liable for "official conduct ...
reasonably undertaken to protect or provide for the public health, safety, or wel-
fare"); H.R. 5993, supra (no liability for "action [taken] in the reasonable exercise
of [its] legislative, regulatory, executive, administrative orjudicial powers"); H.R.
6027 (no liability for action that officials "could reasonably have.., construed to
be within the ...authority of [the local government]"). Other proposed bills
tied immunity either to the existence of state authorization or to the availability of
Parker immunity for similar activity if undertaken by the state itself. See, e.g., H.R.
2981, supra; H.R. 3361, supra; S. 1578 (as amended), supra; H.R. 5573, supra.
2 Public Law No. 98-544 (1984) provides:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may
be cited as the "Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984."
Sec. 2. For purposes of this Act -
(1) The term "local government" means -
(A) a city, country, parish, town, township village, or any other gen-
eral function governmental unit established by State law, or
(B) a school district, sanitary district, or any other special function
governmental unit established by State law in one or more States.
(2) the term "person" has the meaning given it in subsection (a) of
the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(A)), but does not
include any local government as defined in paragraph (1) of this sec-
tion, and
(3) the term "State" has the meaning given it in section 4G(2) of the
Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15g(2)).
Sec. 3(a). No damages, interest on damages, costs, or attorney's fees
may be recovered under section 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act (15
U.S.C. 15, 15a, or 15c) from any local government or official or em-
ployee thereof acting in an official capacity.
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to cases commenced before the
effective date of this Act unless the defendant establishes and the
court determines, in light of all the circumstances, including the
stage of litigation and the availability of litigation and the availability
of alternative relief under the Clayton Act, that it would be inequita-
ble not to apply this subsection to a pending case.
In consideration of this section, existence of ajury verdict, district
court judgment, or any stage of litigation subsequent thereto, shall
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covered under section 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act (15
U.S.C. § 15, 15a, or 15c) from any local government, or
official or employee thereof acting in an official capac-
ity."' 13 Section 4(a) of the Act established a similar limita-
tion on the remedy that is available "against a person
based on any official action directed by a local govern-
ment, or official or employee thereof acting in an official
capacity." 14
Moreover, section 3(b) of the Act permits the limitation
on remedy in section 3(a) - but not section 4(a) - to be
given retrospective effect. Section 3(b) allows section
3(a)'s prohibition against damages (and costs, including
attorney's fees) to be applied "to cases commenced
before the effective date of this Act 15 [if] the defendant
be deemed to be prima facie evidence that subsection (a) shall not
apply.
Sec. 4(a). No damages, interest on damages, costs or attorney's
fees may be recovered under section 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act
(15 U.S.C. 15, 15a, or 15c) in any claim against a person based on
any official action directed by a local government, or official or em-
ployee thereof acting in an official capacity.
(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to cases com-
menced before the effective date of this Act.
Sec. 5. Section 510 of the Departments of Commerce,Justice and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1985
(Public Law 98-411), is repealed.
Sec. 6. This Act shall take effect thirty days before the date of the
enactment of this Act.
'13 Id. § 3(a).
" Id. § 4(a).
15 The effective date of the Act is "thirty days before the date of enactment of
this Act." "Enactment" does not appear in the Constitution, and its meaning may
be debated. Some secondary sources state that "enactment" refers to legislative
rather than executive action, 4 THE GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW 291 (West 1984), or
use "enactment," "passage" and "effective date" interchangeably, 73 AM. JUR. 2D
Statutes § 362 (1964). Few federal courts have addressed the question of what
enactment means, probably because most bills either are silent on the issue or
specify precisely an effective date. Federal courts appear to interpret "enact-
ment" as occurring when the legislation receives executive approval or otherwise
becomes law. E.g., Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974) (date of
enactment and effective date used interchangeably in case where no issue was
presented by the possible difference in meaning); Central Freight Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 669 F.2d 1063, 1067 (5th Cir. 1982) (court distinguished between
"passage" by Congress and enactment). This interpretation also is supported by
state cases, see Staddle v. Township of Battle Creek, 77 N.W.2d 329, 331 (Mich.
1956); State v. Gibbons, 203 P. 390, 393 (Wash. 1922), and is consistent with the
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establishes and the court determines, in light of all the cir-
cumstances, including the state of litigation and the avail-
ability of alternative relief under the Clayton Act, that it
would be inequitable not to apply [section 3(a)] to a pend-
ing case."16 In addition, section 6 provides for a limited,
"automatic" retrospectivity by providing that the Act shall
become effective thirty days prior to approval by the
President. '7
Sections 3 and 4 of the Act pose a number of difficult
problems of construction, most of which can be resolved
only by reference to the state-action immunity doctrine
and the legislative history of the Act."' One issue, how-
definitions in legal dictionaries, e.g., BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 472 (5th ed. 1979)
(enactment is the method or process by which a bill becomes a law).
In light of the conflicting authority, however, an argument could be made that
the Act's effective date is 30 days prior to passage by Congress, or September 11,
1984, thereby providing the immunity in § 3(a) for rases filed between September
11 and September 24, 1984, as well as those cases filed between September 24
and October 24. The apparent purpose of the 30-day, automatic retrospectivity
was to defeat the last-minute attempts of antitrust plaintiffs to file their actions
before the Act became law. See 47 BNA ANTITRUST REP. 647 (1984) (statement of
Rep. Seiberling). Thus, Congress may have intended that the 30 days be mea-
sured from the date H.R. 6027 passed both houses, a date certain, rather than the
more uncertain date of presidential approval. On the other hand, the Constitu-
tion requires that the President approve or return all bills within 10 days, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, and even when Congress's adjournment prevents a bill's
return, a bill that is not signed by the tenth day after presentation, excluding Sun-
days, is vetoed. See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 672, 674, 691-92 (1929) (if.
Congress' adjournment prevented the President from returning a bill on the tenth
day after presentation, "it did not become law"). Cf Wright v. United States, 302
U.S. 583, 593 (1938) (President's time for consideration of bill expires on tenth
day); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (failure to approve
bill within 10 days, even during adjournment that prevents the bill's return, con-
sitututes pocket veto). Thus, "30 days prior to passage by Congress," is as ascer-
tainable a date as "30 days prior to approval" and just as efficaciously
accomplished the purpose of the 30 days' retrospectivity.
H.R. 6027 passed both houses on October 11, 1984, was presented to the Presi-
dent on October 19, see 130 Cong. Rec. H 12287 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1984), and the
President approved it on October 24, 1984 (four days after presentation, exclud-
ing one intervening Sunday, cf U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2), which makes the
effective date of the Act September 24, 1984. Thus, by its terms, the Act provides
for a limited retrospectivity; the limitation of remedy in § 3(a) applies to all cases
filed up to 30 days before the date on which the Act was signed into law.
16 Public L. No. 98-544, supra note 12, § 3(b) (footnote added).
17 See supra note 15.
'8The questions raised by the Act include the following:
(a) What is the extent of the limitation of remedy with respect to officials and
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ever, stands more or less alone in that crowd, an issue that
has little to do with the Parker doctrine and that was not
debated by Congress before it enacted the immunity leg-
islation: Whether Congress' retroactive elimination of the
damage remedy for antitrust violations by local govern-
ments or their officials or employees constitutes a depri-
vation of property without due process or, as Senator
Symms suggested,' 9 a taking of property without just
compensation.
II.
The retrospective application of section 3(a) of the Act
- reflected in both the effective date provided by section
6, which precedes enactment by thirty days, and section
3(b)'s balancing test - was the result, in Senator Metzen-
baum's words, of "hard-fought, difficult negotiations. 20
In particular, "[a] number of Senators felt quite strongly
that a plaintiff who has won a jury verdict should not have
the verdict taken away by intervening legislation - others
employees in light of the limiting language in § 3(a), "acting in an official capac-
ity"?
(b) Under what circumstances may the limitation be avoided by suing officials
and employees in their individual capacity as well as their official capacity?
(c) Should the limitation apply in cases in which the official's or employee's
action (1) was unlawful under state or local law, (2) constituted an ultra vires act, or
(3) was taken in bad faith?
(d) Does the Act's elimination of the damages remedy exclude the possibility of
equitable restitution in an appropriate case?
(e) Does the Act's elimination of damages and attorneys' fees under the anti-
trust laws affect their availability under other federal laws, e.g. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1988?
(f) What additional factors, other than those specifically listed in § 3(b) of the
Act, may be considered by a court in deciding whether § 3(a) should be applied
retrospectively in a given case?
(g) In deciding the issue of retrospective application, the court is directed by
§ 3(b) of the Act to consider the availability of alternative relief, principally injunc-
tive relief. May a plaintiff with unclean hands, or a plaintiff who has sold his prop-
erty or franchise, argue that injunctive relief is unavailable and defeat the
governmental defendant's claim that immunity should be applied retrospectively?
(h) What is the scope of the immunity for nongovernmental defendants pro-
vided for in § 4(a) of the Act?
19 See 130 CONG. REc. S 14366-67 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (memorandum intro-
duced by Sen. Symms) (hereinafter cited as Symms memorandum).
20 Id. at S14368 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (comments of Sen. Metzenbaum).
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disagreed."'" As these comments and those of other con-
gressmen 22 indicate, the central concern of the conferees
was the fairness of applying the immunity to cases already
commenced. Indeed, section 3(b) requires the judge in
such cases to determine that failure to give section 3(b)
retrospective application "would be inequitable."2 3
Until the closing minutes of debate on the Act, how-
ever, Congress did not consider the constitutional limits
on its authority to eliminate the damage remedy with re-
spect to a case already commenced or to a cause of action
that had accrued. Then Senator Symms introduced a
memorandum, which was ordered printed in the Congres-
sional Record but was never discussed, that argued there is
a "very good likelihood" that the courts would find that
"the proposed bill effects a taking of property without just
compensation. '2 4 If the courts found a taking, the memo-
randum argued, the Tucker Act 25 would "provide Claims
court jurisdiction for suits against the United States
grounded upon the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution. "26
21 Id. See also id. at H12187 (retroactivity was a "key issue") (remarks of Rep.
Fish).
22 See id. at H12185-86 (comments of Rep. Porter), H12186-88 (comments of
Reps. Crane, Hyde, Rodino, Seiberling and Fish).
2- Act, supra note 10, § 3(b) (emphasis added).
24 Symms memorandum, supra note 19, at S 14366. The lack of debate over the
constitutionality of the Act's retrospectivity tends to provide support for Judge
Mikva's recent assertion that Congress lacks the institutional and political capacity
to engage in effective constitutional deliberation. See Mikva, How Well Does Congress
Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.L. REV. 587 (1983). For a contrary view,
see Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.L. REV. 707
(forthcoming 1985).
25 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1982) gives the United States Claims Court "jurisdic-
tion to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress .... "
26 Symms memorandum, supra note 19, at S14366. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana also concluded that the Tucker Act
would provide jurisdiction for any claim against the United States in which an
antitrust plaintiff alleged that the Act effected an unconstitutional taking of prop-
erty. SeeJefferson Disposal Co. v. Parish ofJefferson, 603 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. La.
1985). The court rejected plaintiff's due process challenge to the Act, however,
on the ground that retrospectivity was justified by the "great national concern"
over municipal antitrust liability and the Act merely altered the remedy available
to plaintiffs without changing their substantive rights. Id. at 1136. These issues
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Senator Symms based his conclusion almost entirely
upon the Ninth Circuit's 1982 decision, In re Aircrash in
Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974. 7 In that case, plaintiffs
obtained a judgment in their wrongful death action in dis-
trict court against an international air carrier and were
awarded damages of $951,000.28 The Ninth Circuit held
that the Warsaw Convention's 29 limitation on liability3 0
pre-empted California state law and that plaintiffs' judg-
ments should be reduced accordingly. The court of ap-
peals rejected plaintiffs' arguments that preemption
would constitute a depriviation of property without due
process and an impermissible burden on their decedents'
right to travel, principally because the impact of preemp-
tion would be ameliorated to the extent plaintiffs had a
taking claim that could be pursued against the United
States under the fifth amendment. 3' The court held that
the Tucker Act 32 conferred the United States Claims
Court with jurisdiction over such a claim.33
Although the Bali court explicitly refrained from decid-
ing whether the Warsaw Convention may effect a taking,3
4
are discussed infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text. The only other district
court decision under the Act as this article is being written gave the Act retrospec-
tive effect by dismissing an antitrust claim filed on September 7, 1984, but the
court did not discuss the constitutional issues raised by its action, see TCI Cablevi-
sion, Inc. v. City ofJefferson, 604 F. Supp. 845 (W.D. Mo. 1984), perhaps because
an alternate ground existed for the dismissal, see id. at 846-47.
27 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
28 In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
29 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 127 L.N.T.S.
11 (1934) (hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention).
30 The current limitation, as established by the so-called "Montreal Agree-
ment," CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, AGREEMENT 18900, AGREEMENT RELATING TO
LIABILITY LIMITATIONS OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND THE HAGUE PROTOCOL,
approved 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) (Civil Aeronautics Board, Order No. E-23680
(May 13, 1966) ), is $75,000. (For the text of the Montreal Agreement, see 1966
U.S. & Aviation Report 450). For a useful summary of the limitation-of-liability
provisions of the Warsaw Convention, see Comment, After Bali: Can The Warsaw
Convention Be Proven A Taking Under the Fifth Amendment? 49J. AIR L. & COM. 947,
951-60 (1984).
31 Bali, 684 F.2d at 1310.
32 See supra note 25.
s Bali, 684 F.2d at 1310.
34 Id. at 1312.
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the Symms memorandum nonetheless characterized Bali
as "[t]he most recent authority for the proposition that
[the Act] would effect a taking of property, where a cause
of action in antitrust law has already accrued."' 35 This as-
sertion ignores not only the Ninth Circuit's own limitation
on its holding, but also the apparent limitations on its rea-
soning. As the court recognized, Bali did not involve "a
change in law, but the limitation of an independently ex-
isting right under state law, "36 an apparent reference to
the principle that a sovereign has considerable, though
not complete, freedom to modify rights that it has created
by statute. 7
The Symms memorandum more nearly resembles a "hit
and run" effort to raise without resolving the significant
issue of the Act's constitutionality, but its message will not
be lost on plaintiffs' counsel who are asked to demon-
strate to a trial court why the Act should not be applied
retrospectively to their claims for antitrust damages. The
remainder of this article attempts to fashion a guide
through the seemingly inconsistent and unnecessarily
perplexing decisional law applicable to the constitutional-
ity of the Act.
III.
Although the Constitution's sole explicit limitation on
the ability of Congress to enact retrospective legisltation,
the ex post facto clause, 38 has been judicially limited to
criminal or penal statutes, 39 the Supreme Court has con-
15 Symms memorandum, supra note 19, at S14366.
36 Bali, 684 F.2d at 1312 n.10.
37 See Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Litigation, 51 N.W. U.L.
REV. 540, 559 (1956); Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retro-
active Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 717 (1960); Slawson, Constitutional and Leg-
islative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CAL. L. REV. 216, 249 (1960).
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. The Constitution, of course, also limits the
states' ability to pass ex post facto law or laws "impairing the Obligation of Con-
tract." Id. § 10, cl. 1.
39 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 390, 397 (1798).
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strued the due process clause of the fifth amendment 40 as
imposing such a limitation implicitly. 4' The limitation de-
rives from the substantive due process doctrine; thus, de-
cisions in this area have waxed and waned approximately
as has the doctrine itself. In addition, Congress has
sought to act retrospectively in a variety of settings, and
the factual differences in the cases, not surprisingly, have
had a significant bearing on the results.
In addition, if the just compensation clause 42 were
deemed applicable to retrospective legislation, as the Bali
Court and the Symms memorandum suggest it should be,
it could constitute yet another limitation on Congress'
legislative power in this area. It would attach a price tag
measured in terms of treble damages to the Act every
time its application to an accrued cause of action orjudg-
ment were deemed to constitute a taking of private
property.
A cause of action is a species of "property" that is pro-
tected by the due process and just compensation clauses 43
and so, a fortiori, is a claim that has ripened into a judg-
ment. Both accrued causes of action44 and judgments,4 5
40 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law").
41 See e.g.,J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 471-76 (2d
ed. 1983). In addition, the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment, made
applicable to the federal government for some purposes by Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954), could be similarly construed as a limitation upon the legislature's
ability to single out a group with respect to whom the benefits and burdens of
economic life are to be reallocated. It does not appear, however, that the
Supreme Court has ever applied the 14th amendment in this way. Cf Slawson,
supra note 37, at 233-35.
42 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation").
43 See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430-32 (1982); Arm-
strong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). Cf Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277, 281-82 (1980) (state tort claim "arguably" is a form of property).
44 See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911); Battaglia v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948); Slaw-
son, supra note 37, at 249 ("there seems little doubt at the present time that
legislation can impair or remove accrued rights of action to the same extent that it
can impair or destroy other property rights."). Cf Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donald-
son, 325 U.S. 304, 311-15 (1945) (defense based on statute of limitations may be
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however, may be impaired or destroyed by subsequent
legislation as long as there is no denial of the protections
provided by the Constitution. Judgments, particularly fi-
nal ones, are undoubtedly entitled to a greater level of
protection than mere causes of action,4 6 and the Act rec-
ognizes this by providing that the existence of ajudgment
awarding damages to an antitrust plaintiff constitutes
"prima facie evidence" that section 3(a)'s prohibition
should not be applied retrospectively.4 7 For purposes of
the following analysis, accrued causes of action and judg-
ments are assumed to be property interests entitled to the
full measure of the Fifth Amendment's protection.
In practice, challenges to retrospective legislation are
usually based upon a substantive due process argument.
Accordingly, the following sections discuss the due pro-
cess clause first and then the just compensation clause. In
addition, the discussion does not distinguish for most
purposes between the two provisions in the Act that can
give rise to retrospective application of section 3(a)'s bar
abolished by subsequent legislation extending limitations period). But see
Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932) (where right to enforce liability, based on
contract authorized by state statute, was perfected before repeal of authorizing
statute, repeal did not extinguish liability); Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148
(1913) (repeal of state statute granting compensation for damages could not de-
stroy compensation rights that accrued while the statute was in effect); Steamship
Co. v. Joliffe, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 450 (1864) (a perfected right that arises under a
contract authorized by statute is not affected by repeal of the statute).
4-5 See, e.g., Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947); Paramino Lumber Co.
v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370, 378-79 (1940). See also H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 648 (tent. ed.
1958):
Cf 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199 (judgment for em-
ployees in action for overtime pay affirmed May 5); S.C., 331 U.S.
795 (1947) (judgment modified, after the Portal-to Portal Act be-
came law on May 14 to give the district court authority "to consider
any matters presented to it under" that Act); S.C., S.D.N.Y. 1948, 79
F. Supp. 41[3] (defendant employer permitted to amend answer to
make new defenses under new act).
But see Massingill v. Downes, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 760 (1849) (alternative holding).
46 See Hochman, supra note 37, at 718 ("[O]nce ... a right has been reduced to
judgment, the interest in stability is present to a significantly greater extent than
at any time before judgment. Moreover, there is likely to be substantial reliance
on the judgment.")
47 Act, supra note 12, § 3(b).
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to a damage recovery. Both the automatic thirty-day re-
trospectivity of section 648 and the equitable retrospectiv-
ity provided for in section 3(b)4" may preclude an award
of damages with respect to claims that have accrued but
have not been sued upon, cases that have been com-
menced but have not gone to judgment, and judgments
that have not yet become final. Where the balancing of
factors that is a condition of retrospectivity under section
3(b) might have a difference to the analysis in the follow-
ing section, the difference between the two types of re-
trospectivity is noted.
A.
After years of unpredictable decisions50 and the labored
analysis of commentators, 5' the United States Supreme
Court attempted in 1976, in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co.,52 to rationalize the substantive due process doctrine
as it applies to retrospective federal civil legislation. In
Turner Elkhorn, Congress had amended Title IV of the
48 See supra note 15.
49 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
5o Compare, e.g., Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs, 258 U.S. 338
(1922) (state statute purporting to extinguish claim for refund of tolls unlawfully
demanded violated due process clause of 14th amendment), and Ettor v. City of
Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148 (1913) (repeal of statute that allowed certain landowners to
collect consequential damages from changes in street grade violated due process
clause), with, e.g. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945) (state's ex-
tension of statute of limitations, which had the effect of resurrecting plaintiff's
otherwise time-barred claim under Minnesota's Blue Sky Law, held not to violate
due process clause), and Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Co., 204 F.2d 88 (2d Cir.)
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 877 (1953) (federal "Overtime-on-Overtime" Act, which
redefined "regular rate" for purposes of overtime computation under Fair Labor
Standards Act and made the change retroactive as to some employers, held not to
violate due process clause of fifth amendment).
51 See, e.g., H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 45, at 640-51;J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, supra note 41, at 471-77; H. READ, J. MACDONALD, J. FORDHAM & W.
PIERCE, MATERIAL ON LEGISLATION 524-43 (3d ed. 1973); DeMars, Retrospectivity
and Retroactivity of Civil Legislation Reconsidered, 10 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 253 (1983);
Greenblatt, supra note 37; Hochman, supra note 37; Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 373 (1977); Slawson, supra note 37; Smead, The Rule Against Retroac-
tive Legislation: A Basic Principle ofJurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775 (1936); Smith,
Retroactive Law and Vested Rights, 5 TEX. L. REV. 231 (1927) (Part I); 6 TEX. L. REV.
409 (1928) (Part II).
52 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969" by en-
acting the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972. 54 The 1972
legislation provided benefits to miners suffering from the
disease, 55 including in both cases miners who left em-
ployment in the coal industry prior to the effective date of
the 1972 act.5 6 Coal mine operators claimed that this as-
pect of legislation deprived them of property without due
process on the theory "that to impose liability upon them
for former employees' disabilities is impermissibly to
charge them with an unexpected liability for past, com-
pleted acts that were legally proper and, at least in part,
unknown to be dangerous at the time." 57
The Court rejected the constitutional challenge. First,
the Court eliminated any blanket principle of invalidity
for retroactive civil legislation: "legislation readjusting
rights and burdens is not lawful solely because it upsets
otherwise settled expectations. This is true even though
the effect of the legislation is to impose a new duty or lia-
bility based on past acts."5 8
The constitutional test of retrospective legislation is
that of due process, and the Court indicated that the pro-
spective and retrospective aspects of a statute are to be
tested separately. 59 Thus, retrospectivity must itself be ra-
tionally related to a legitimate governmental objective. In
Turner Elkhorn, the Court discerned a legitimate objective
- spreading the costs of the employees' disability - and
concluded that the retrospective imposition of liability
was a "rational measure ' 60 to accomplish that goal.
It is unclear whether the Court's due process test is
53 Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 792 (1969) (current version of Title IV at 30
U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1982)).
5, Public L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (1972) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-02,
921-24, 931-34, 936-40, 951 (1982)).
5- Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 8 (1976).
56 Id. at 8-12.
-17 Id. at 15.
58 Id. at 16 (citations omitted).
59 Id. at 17.
6 Id. at 18. See also id. at 19 ("The Act approaches the problem of cost-spread-
ing rationally").
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more subtle or elaborate than the two preceding
paragraphs indicate. As a part of its due process analysis,
for instance, the Court stated that "the justification for
[retrospectivity] must take into account ' 61 the mine oper-
ators' past knowledge of the dangerousness of their activ-
ity and the possibility that the owners would have acted
differently in the past if the law had imposed liability on
them at the time.62 Ordinarily, these factors have been
weighed to assess the fairness of retrospective changes in
the law,63 and the Court may someday refer to them for
that purpose. The Court's purpose in acknowledging
these factors in Turner Elkorn, however, was first to raise,
and then reject, the possibility that these factors might
support two alternative justifications for retrospectivity:
deterrence64 and punishment of blameworthy conduct.65
Despite the Court's best efforts to keep the due process
test for retrospective federal legislation simple and
straight-forward, the confusion was continued last term in
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co. 66 In that
case, Congress had enacted the Multi-employer Pension
Plan Amendments Act ("Amendments Act"), 67 which pro-
vided in part that an employer withdrawing from a multi-
employer pension plan would be required to pay the
61 Id. at 17. Cf Slawson, supra note 37, at 221-33 (analyzing due process in
terms of a choice and reliance).
62 428 U.S. at 17.
63 Logically, if a plaintiff lacked the knowledge to act differently, or did, not act a
particular way in reliance upon the former state of the law, "there is no reason
why a retroactive [change] is any less desirable than a prospective one," Slawson,
supra note 37, at 225. Nonetheless, the Court seems to say that knowledge of the
dangers (i.e., a basis for acting differently) would tend to justify retrospectivity,
rather than cut against it, 428 U.S. at 17 ("While the Operators have clearly been
aware of the danger of pneumoconiosis for at least 20 years, . . . we would never-
theless hesitate to approve the retrospective imposition of liability... ").
- Deterrence is a poor theory to justify retrospectivity in any case, since deter-
rence, like the normative function of law generally, seems unqualifiedly prospec-
tive in nature. See Raz, On the Functions of Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 278, 281 (A. Simpson 2d series 1973). Cf 0. HOLMES, THE COM-
MON LAw 42 (M. Howe ed. 1963) ("For the most part, the purpose of the criminal
law is only to induce external conformity to rule.").
65 Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 17-18.
104 S. Ct. 2709 (1984).
67 Public L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (1980).
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share of the fund's unvested liabilities attributable to that
employer's participation in the plan.68 The amendments
were intended to alleviate the federal Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation's massive unfunded liability, which
threatened to exceed the corporation's ability to pay, to
protect retirement plans from the adverse effects of em-
ployer withdrawal, and to provide a disincentive to such
withdrawals.69
The amendment provisions that imposed liability on
employers who voluntarily withdraw from multi-employer
pension plans were made effective five months before en-
actment. 70 This retrospective imposition of liability was
challenged by an employer who withdrew from its multi-
employer pension plan during the five-month period of
retrospectivity, incurring a withdrawal liability of over
$200,000 in the process. After the district court granted
summary judgment to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration on the employer's due process claim, 71 the Ninth
Circuit reversed,72 relying principally upon Nachman Corp.
v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. In Nachman, the Seventh
Circuit identified four factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether retrospective civil legislation satisfies the
test in Turner Elkhorn: "[1 ] the reliance interests of the par-
ties affected, [2] whether the impairment of the private in-
terest is effected in an area previously subjected to
regulatory control, [3] the equities of imposing the legis-
lative burdens, and [4] the inclusion or statutory provi-
sions designed to limit and moderate the impact of the
Gm R.A. Gray, 104 S. Ct. at 2712.
69 Id. at 2711-12.
70 Id. at 2712.
7 R.A. Gray & Co. v. Oregon Washington Carpenters-Employers Pension
Trust, 549 F. Supp. 531 (D. Or. 1982). The employer also challenged the consti-
tutionality of the retrospective imposition of liability on equal protection and pro-
cedural due process grounds, under the ex post facto clause, and as a denial of its
right to trial byjury. See 104 S. Ct. at 2716 n.5. Only the substantive due process
issue was presented to the Supreme Court.
12 Shelter Framing Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 705 F.2d 1502 (9th
Cir. 1983). For ease of reference, this decision will be referred to in text as R.A.
Gray, from the style of the Supreme Court's opinion.
75 592 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1979), afd, 446 U.S. 359 (1980).
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burdens.'74 The Ninth Circuit concluded, on the basis of
factors [1] and [3] in particular, that the retrospectivity of
the Amendments Act violated due process.7 5
The Supreme Court reversed and reiterated the
message in Turner Elkhorn that the Seventh and Ninth Cir-
cuits had failed to heed: the burden of demonstrating
that the retrospective provision of a federal civil statute
satisfies the test of due process "is met simply by showing
that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself
justified by a rational legislative purpose. ' 76 The Court
emphasized that "the strong deference accorded legisla-
tion in the field of national economic policy is no less ap-
plicable when the legislation is applied retroactively. 7 7
The test is simply whether "the retroactive application of
a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose
furthered by rational means. 78 In this case, the Court
easily concluded that the retrospective imposition of with-
drawal liability on employers was a rational means to re-
duce the number of voluntary withdrawals; creation of a
liability that was only prospective could have produced a
rash of voluntary withdrawals and partially, if not substan-
tially, defeated the purpose of the amendment.79
If the Court's insistence that its due process test is a
"simple" one is accepted at face value, the retrospectivity
of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 easily
passes muster. Indeed, the automatic thirty-day retros-
pectivity of section 6 is justifiable on the same ground as
that to which the Supreme Court adverted in R.A. Gray.
Retrospectivity was necessary to avoid the exacerbation
due to eleventh-hour activity (the filing of antitrust suits)
of the evil (numerous claims for damages against local
governments) against which the new legislation was di-
rected. The limited retrospectivity of section 3(b) is not
74 Id. at 960 (citations omitted).
75 705 F.2d at 1511-14.
76 104 S. Ct. at 2718.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 2718-19.
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much more difficult to justify. Congress decided that lo-
cal governments need to be relieved of the burdens im-
posed by the treble damages provision of the federal
antitrust laws. The burdens are, principally, trebled
money judgments in those few cases that will go to judg-
ment and, perhaps more significantly, the cost of defend-
ing against antitrust claims and the chilling effect on local
decision makers that all antitrust suits can be expected to
produce.8 0 If pending treble damage claims are allowed
to go forward, Congress' objective to minimize or elimi-
nate the first two of these burdens will be seriously under-
cut. Some cases will produce money judgments for
plaintiffs, and all cases will impose defense costs on local
governments. (The threat of future treble damage claims,
rather than the impact of a pending claim, is the principal
source of any chilling effect on decisionmakers. Retros-
pectivity bears no particular relationship to the elimina-
tion of that burden.) Thus, Congress could rationally
conclude that its objectives would be furthered signifi-
cantly by retrospective application of the prohibition
against money damages.
The problem with the Supreme Court's opinion in R.A.
Gray is that, despite the Court's intention that it do so, the
opinion may not have established a simple rational-basis
due process test. If doctrinal simplicity were desired, the
Court could have rejected the four-part inquiry proposed
by the Nachman court and relied on by the Ninth Circuit,
but it did not do so. Instead, the Court claimed it had "no
occasion to consider whether the factors mentioned by
[the Nachman] court might in some circumstances be rele-
vant in determining whether retroactive legislation is ra-
tional."' 8' This is an inexplicable statement, in light of the
Ninth Circuit's opinion, which considered the four factors
precisely because it deemed them relevant to the question
8o 130 CONG. REC. H12188 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Fish); id.
at H12182 (remarks of Rep. Rodino).
8, 104 S. Ct. at 2717 n.6.
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of rationality under Turner Elkhorn. 2 Nevertheless, the
Court explicitly rejected only "the consitutional under-
pinnings ' 8 3 of the Nachman test and left open the question
of their relevancy to future analyses under Turner Elkhorn.
The Court also equated the well-established rule "that
retrospective civil legislation may offend due process if it
is 'particularly "harsh and oppressive" '84 with the prohi-
bition against arbitrary and irrational legislation that [the
Court] clearly enunciated in Turner Elkhorn. "85 Curi-
ously, it was precisely for guidance on the issue of the
harshness and oppressiveness of the pension law amend-
ments that the Ninth Circuit turned to the four Nachman
factors.8 6 Indeed, a court would be hard pressed to evalu-
ate a claim of harsh and oppressive retrospective impact
without reference to the degree to which a party relied on
earlier law, the justifiability of that reliance (i.e., whether
the area of activity was subject to federal regulation), the
relative burden on affected parties weighed against the
benefits sought to be achieved by retrospectivity, and the
efficacy of moderating provisions (if any) in ameliorating
an otherwise harsh and oppressive impact.
Notwithstanding the Court's protestations to the con-
trary, it appears that plaintiffs challenging the retrospec-
tive application of section 3(a) of the Act may rely upon
the four Nachman factors or their equivalent. Predicting
what a court will do with those factors is an inherently
risky undertaking, in light of the lack of clear, or even con-
sistent, guidance from the Supreme Court, but the gen-
eral lines of analysis seem fairly straightforward.
1. Reliance. As David W. Slawson has observed,
"nothing seems more basic to the existence of a legal or-
der than the ability to rely upon the actions of others, in-
82 See 705 F.2d at 1510.
83 104 S. Ct. at 2717 n.6.
84 Id. at 2720 (quoting United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19
n.13 (1977) (quoting Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938))).
85 Id.
86 See 705 F.2d at 1510, 1514.
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cluding the government, with some assurance. '8 7 There
is, however, an inherent conflict between this need for sta-
bility and the requirement that "the legal order must con-
stantly change to fit new factual conditions or new
conceptions of the common good. '88 Thus, reliance sim-
pliciter does not provide a useful principle for limiting the
legislature's ability to change legal rules retrospectively,
"since it would rule out all but the most inconsequential
legislative change." '89 Nonetheless, whether giving a stat-
ute retrospective application is fair, or whether retrospec-
tivity offends due process because it is, in the Supreme
Court's words, "particularly harsh and oppressive." 90 de-
pends in part upon the degree to which the affected party
either acted or refrained from acting in light of then ex-
isting rules of law and suffered a material loss as a result.
In this respect antitrust plaintiffs are not in the same
position as either a party to a contract that has been ren-
dered unenforceable by subsequent legislation 9' or the
employer in R.A. Gray who withdrew from its multi-em-
ployer pension plan before the Amendments Act became
law.92 In both instances, the parties arguably altered their
positions, e.g., paid insurance premiums, 9 3 purchased gov-
81 Slawson, supra note 37, at 225. See also, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH
59-60 (1960); THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 282 (Rossiter ed. 1961) (Madison);
Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 171, 201 (Wolff ed.
1971). Benjamin Cardozo, on the other hand, doubted that most people relied
significantly on the content of particular judge-made rules, see B. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 146 (1949) ("[I]n the vast majority of cases the
retrospective effect ofjudge-made law is felt either to involve no hardship or only
such hardship as is inevitable where no rule has been declared."), and the point
seems equally valid as to many legislative rules.
8 Slawson, supra note 37, at 226.
8 Id.
- See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
' In addition to the explicit protection that the Constitution accords contract
rights under state law, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass
any . ..Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . ."), decisions under the
due process clause seem to recognize that "[m]ore than other kinds of legally
significant action, . . contracting is likely to be done with knowledge of, and spe-
cific reliance on, the law," Slawson, supra note 37, at 233.
' Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 104 S. Ct. 2709, 2716
(1984).
95 See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
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ernment bonds,9 4 or withdrew from a pension plan when
no withdrawal penalty existed,95 only to suffer a material
loss when subsequent federal legislation upset their set-
tled expectations. Antitrust plaintiffs, on the other hand,
have neither suffered a loss of the primary benefit of their
pre-enactment activity nor had imposed upon them liabil-
ity for some past conduct.96
Antitrust plaintiffs may have acted in reliance upon the
availablity of treble damages, however, to the extent they
conducted depositions and other expensive pretrial dis-
covery, engaged expert consultants, and incurred other
litigation-related liabilities that would not have incurred
had money damages not been available. Regardless of
whether the constitution requires cognizance of such liti-
gation-related reliance,9 7 and apart from the difficulties of
proof such a claim raises, the Act itself appears to take this
type of reliance into account. Section 3(b) explicitly
makes "the state of litigation" one of the factors the court
must consider in determining whether "it would be ineq-
uitable not to apply [section 3(a)] to a pending case." 98
See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
95 See R.A. Gray, 104 S. Ct. at 2716 (1984).
96 Moreover, antitrust immunity bills for local governments had been pending
and extensively discussed in Congress for two years before passage of the Act, and
most of the bills contained no limitation on retrospectivity. Thus, plaintiffs had
some notice of the possibility that any diminution or prohibition of the damage
remedy would be applied to pending as well as future cases.
97 At least one commentator has discerned an attitude "that the expense and
other changes of position involved in litigation are not sufficient to affect the con-
stitutionality of a retroactive statute which would otherwise be valid." Hochman,
supra note 37, at 718.
98 See Act, supra note 12, § 3(b). The automatic 30-day retrospectivity provided
by § 6 will seldom, if ever, do violence to plaintiffs litigation-related reliance in-
terest, because of the near possibility of incurring substantial discovery expenses
during the first 30 days following the commencement of the action. FED. R. Civ.
P. 27(a), for instance, permits a precommencement deposition only with the
court's permission and upon a showing that it is needed "to prevent a failure or
delay of justice." Similarly, a plaintiff will not ordinarily be permitted to take a
deposition until more than 30 days after commencement of the suit, FED. R. Civ.
P. 30(a), except by leave of court or unless the defendant notices a deposition
within the first 30 days, id., or under special, narrowly defined circumstances, see
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(2). Of course, expert consultants may have been retained
and paid prior to commencement of the suit, but the expenditures will seldom be
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The further a suit has proceeded and the more extensive
and expensive the preparation, the more difficult it will be
for the defendant to establish the unfairness of not apply-
ing section 3(a) retrospectively. On balance, however, the
reliance test is not one that favors the antitrust plaintiff.
The only significant reliance is likely to occur in the con-
duct of litigation, which is of doubtful constitutional im-
port, and the Act appears to give that reliance interest
substantial protection in any event.
2. Prior Regulation. The reasonableness of a party's re-
liance on current law and the harshness of a change in
that law depends in part on the extent to which the party's
actions were previously subject to regulation. If the con-
duct was not covered by statute until enactment of the law
that retroactively changed the rules of the game, courts
may place greater weight on a party's reliance interest in
assessing the constitutionality of the law. Conversely,
parties engaged in conduct that is heavily regulated by
Congress are deemed to be on notice that rules could be
changed at any time, possibly to their detriment, and
should plan accordingly. Undoubtedly it is a mistake to
read these sentiments as principles of constitutional law
or rules of decision, despite the Supeme Court's past ten-
dency to do so. 99 Rather, they should simply guide and
inform a court in deciding whether a particular retrospec-
tive law is "unduly harsh and oppressive."
The field of antitrust law is primarily a matter of federal
concern and regulation, at least as to conduct involving
so substantial and the reliance on the availability of the damage remedy so clear
that the 30-day retrospectivity of § 6 will be deemed unduly harsh and oppressive.
99 See Federal Hous. Admin. v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958)(Douglas J.) ("Those who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the
legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legisla-
tive end."). See generally Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100 (1947) (Douglas, J.)(landlord properly enjoined from enforcing eviction judgments obtained during
25-day gap between expiration of Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and Price
Control Extension Act of 1946). The distinction, however, lacks force. As one
commentator has observed, "Whether the realignment of economic and social re-
lationships is sought to be effected by an original statute or a repealer, valuable
interests may be adversely affected; and due process limitations would seem nec-
essary to assure fairness." Greenblatt, supra note 37, at 560.
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interstate commerce. °0 In view of the relatively slight re-
liance interest that an antitrust plaintiff can claim in ex-
isting statutory remedies, and Congress's strong interest
in adjusting the scope and effects of its regulation of the
federal economy through the antitrust laws,' 0 1 the prior-
regulation factor favors the Act rather than antitrust
plaintiffs.
Concern with prior federal regulation suggests the rele-
vance of another well-established but abused rule of
thumb: Whatever may be the limits on Congress's author-
ity to create, abolish, or modify substantive rights retro-
spectively, Congress may amend the procedures or
remedies associated with that right virtually without limi-
tation as long as the change does not destroy a potential
plaintiffs ability to enforce the underlying substantive
right. 10 2 Although the right/remedy dichotomy collapses
in certain cases and may produce endless mischief in the
wrong hands, it embodies the intuitively valid distinction,
described by Professors Hart and Sacks, between a pri-
mary claim to a performance and a remedial capacity to
invoke a sanction for nonperformance."' 10 3 The proce-
dures and remedies that define the "remedial capacity to
invoke a sanction" are generally subject to the control of
the legislature. Thus, the usual rule of statutory construc-
tion, that in the absence of a contrary intention a statute
100 To the extent an antitrust plaintiff also has a state antitrust clause of action
against a local government, the impact of retroactive elimination of damages for
the federal claim is lessened considerably.
, See, e.g. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 338, 340-42
& nn.18-21, 348 (1963); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 57-58
(1911); R. BORE, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 61-66 (1978); W. LETWIN, LAW AND
ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 238-78 (1966). See also Jefferson Disposal Co. v.
Parish of Jefferson, 603 F. Supp. 1125, 1136 (E.D. La. 1985) (Act "deals with a
matter of great national concern").
102 See, e.g. Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 311-12 (1945); Hallo-
well v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506 (1916); United States v. Vanella, 619 F.2d 384
(5th Cir. 1980); Turner v. United States, 410 F.2d 837, 842 (5th Cir. 1969); J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 41, at 475; Slawson, supra note 37, at
242.
1-3 H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 45, at 152.
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will be deemed to operate prospectively only, 10 4 is re-
versed when a statute affects procedure or remedy, and
the statute is deemed to apply retroactively.10 5
The Act affects only the damage remedy formerly avail-
able against local governments under the Clayton Act,
leaving intact a plaintiffs antitrust cause of action and
other non-damage remedies. Moreover, it is doubtful that
any court would see the retrospective elimination of the
damage remedy as a practical elimination of the right to
be free of unduly restrictive, anticompetitive conduct.
This is particularly true in light of section 3(b)'s explicit
requirement that the court consider "the availability of al-
ternative relief under the Clayton Act" in deciding
whether "it would be inequitable not to apply [section
3(a)] to a pending case." 106 In the extraordinary case in
which the elimination of the damage remedy virtually ex-
tinguishes the underlying substantive right, the Act per-
mits the court to deny retrospectivity. Thus, on its face,
the Act seems to be drafted specifically to avoid unconsti-
tutionality on this ground.
3. Balance of Equities. The third factor considered by
the Ninth Circuit in R.A. Gray weighed the benefits that
Congress sought to achieve through the Amendments Act
against the burdens on withdrawing employers. 0 7 This
inquiry draws on a long line of federal cases in which Con-
gress acted in response to a national emergency' 0 8 or en-
, See, e.g., 4 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.04 (Sands 4th ed.
1973); W. WADE, RETROACTIVE LAWS § 34, at 39-40 (photo. reprint 1980).
1- See, e.g., United States v. Vanella, 619 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1980); Koger v.
Ball, 397 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1974); Bowles v. Strickland, 151 F.2d 419 (5th Cir.
1945); SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 104, § 41.09, at 280-81;
W. WADE, supra note 104, § 38.
1- Act, supra note 12, § 3(b). See also Jefferson Disposal Co. v. Parish of Jeffer-
son, 603 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (E.D. La. 1985) (Act "does not, in any manner, alter
the substantive rights of the parties").
107 See Shelter Framing Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 705 F.2d 1502,
1512-14 (9th Cir. 1983).
1o This classification appears to have originated with Hochman, supra note 37,
at 698, and was adopted by J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 41 at
472. See generally Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Veix v. Sixth Ward
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940); Home Bldg..& Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
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acted "curative" legislation' °9 and the courts upheld the
retroactivity, largely because the strong federal interest
promoted by the change in law outweighed the individ-
ual's interests under the former law.
In this regard, the Court has gone out of its way, first in
Turner Elkhorn"m and more recently in R.A. Gray,"' to
state that a presumption of constitutionality attaches to
"legislative acts adjusting the benefits and burdens of eco-
nomic life," ' 1 2 and that the Court accords such legislation,
even if it applies retrospectively, "strong deference."' '1
Thus, the public need for the Act as perceived by Con-
gress, while not rising to the level of emergency present in
certain Depression-era cases," t 4 is certainly a strong, pos-
sibly compelling, justification for retrospectivity.
Weighed against this strong public-interest objective,
the Act's impact on plaintiffs whose claims accrued before
the Act became law is not particularly significant. That
substantial monetary loss alone is not decisive in estab-
lishing the harshness or oppressiveness of retrospectivity
was made clear in R.A. Gray, in which the withdrawal lia-
bility of the employer exceeded $200,000."1 Rather,
plaintiffs must show that the burden on them is not out-
weighed by the legislative interest promoted by the Act.
While plaintiffs can be expected to claim that their finan-
cial burden is their actual economic injury trebled, the
290 U.S. 398 (1934); Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.
1948). But see Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935)
(emergency legislation held unconstitutional).
,09 The phrase originated wtih Slawson, supra note 37, at 238-39, and was
adopted byJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 41, at 473. The latter
defines such legislation as "those measures that will either ratify prior official con-
duct or make a remedial adjustment in an administrative scheme." Id. Seegenerally
Federal Hous. Adm. v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958); United States v.
Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370 (1907).
1o Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
11 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 104 S. Ct. 2709 (1984).
112 Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 15; R.A.Gray, 104 S.Ct. at 2717 (quoting Turner
Elkhorn).
" R.A. Gray, 104 S. Ct. at 2718.
,14 See supra note 108.
15 See R.A. Gray, 104 S. Ct. at 2716.
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value of the damage award prohibited by the Act, it is just
as accurate to say that the impact is equal to the amount
of their actual damages before trebling: their uncompen-
sated injury. If the latter is accepted as the measure of the
Act's retrospective impact on plaintiffs, the bene-
fit/burden ratio significantly favors the Act, because local
government defendants will be protected from treble-
damage awards while the direct cost to plaintiffs is their
uncompensated, untrebled antitrust injury.
Even if the impact on plaintiffs is equal to the trebled
damage award they are denied, plaintiffs will have great
difficulty demonstrating the Act's unconstitutionality
under the balance-of-equities test. Since Congress' power
to alter the remedies available under the antitrust laws
prospectively, i.e., as to causes of action that accrue after
the enactment date of the legislation, is not even fairly de-
batable, plaintiffs challenging the retrospective applica-
tion of such a change must show that they are significantly
different from plaintiffs who are affected only by the pro-
spective change. Except for litigation expenses, which the
Constitution does not value but the Act nonetheless pro-
tects, 11 6 it is difficult to imagine how such a difference can
arise. Thus, the balancing of equities does not favor the
challengers of retrospectivity.
4. Moderating Provisions. The Act attempts to avoid an
unconstitutional level of harshness or oppressiveness due
to retrospectivity by requiring local-government defend-
ants to establish that it would be inequitable not to apply
section 3(a) in cases commenced before the effective
date. ' 17 If properly applied, therefore, the Act guards
against unfairness that might result from its retrospective
application and render it unconstitutional.
On balance, the retrospective provisions of the Act sat-
isfy both the explicit and the unstated due process
requirements of Turner Elkhorn and R.A. Gray. Retrospec-
tivity is rationally related to a proper legislative purpose
116 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
See Act, supra note 12, § 3(b).
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and should not be unduly harsh and oppressive in any
particular instance. There remains, however, the ques-
tion raised directly by the Symms memorandum: Will the
retrospective abolition of the Clayton Act's damage rem-
edy effect an uncompensated taking of property?" 8
B.
The Symms memorandum raised and purported to an-
swer the issue of whether Congress' retrospective applica-
tion of section 3(a) of the Act to wipe out accrued claims
for money damages under the federal antitrust laws con-
stitutes a taking of property for which just compensation
must be paid. In working toward an answer to this issue,
it has been necessary to take an extended detour through
the case law that has considered the traditional due pro-
cess based limitations on retrospective federal civil legis-
lation. The answer proposed in the preceding section is
that the Act satisfies the requirements of substantive due
process.
The Act's retrospectivity also does not amount to a tak-
ing, and, although this is not intuitively obvious, the rea-
sons why the Act does not effect a taking are virtually the
same reasons that explain the Act's validity under the due
process clause. In the context of a challenge to retrospec-
tive civil legislation, the fifth amendment's just compensa-
tion clause and the common law of takings" 19 add nothing
to the due process clause protections against harsh and
oppressive retrospective legislation.
This result at first seems at least peculiar and certainly
counter to the spirit of recent Supreme Court decisions.
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 120 for example, the Court care-
II See Symms memorandum, supra note 19.
119 The Constitution contains no express grant of eminent domain power to the
federal government. SeeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 41, at 481
(citing Comment, State and Federal Power of Eminent Domain, 4 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
130, 131 (1935)). Rather, it assumes the existence of the power and states that
the exercise of that power requires the payment ofjust compensation for property
taken. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See supra note 42.
12o 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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fully distinguished between the issue of the President's
power to settle the claims of United States citizens against
Iran and the question whether that settlement might con-
stitute a taking of property.' 2' Again, in Kaiser Aetna v.
United States,' 22 the Court stated that while the federal gov-
ernment's authority under the commerce clause to pro-
vide a free right of access to a private marina was
unquestionable, "[w]hether a statute or regulation that
went so far amounted to a 'taking,' however, is an entirely
separate question."' t23 The dichotomy between the gov-
ernment's power to take action and the necessity that the
action be paid for goes back at least as far as Justice
Holmes's opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.t2 4 In
that case, the Court entertained no doubt about the
state's power to control mining operations under resi-
dences threatened by subsidence. Rather, "the question
at bottom is upon whom the loss of-the changes desired
[by the state] should fall.' 25 Stated in terms of the Act,
the principle in these cases is this: Even if retrospectivity
rationally advances a legitimate governmental objective,
does it nonetheless constitute a taking of property?
Until the Pennsylvania Coal Co. case, such a question was
almost unimaginable. Justice Holmes's famous dictum
that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking"'' 26 represented an extension of the concept of
"taking," which had before then been limited to the actual
appropriation or physical invasion of property.'2 7 Despite
the Court's opening in Pennsylvania Coal Co., however,
challenges to retrospective federal civil legislation have
been based on the due process clause, not the just com-
121 Id. at 688-89 n.14.
122 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
,2- Id. at 174.
124 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
1'2 Id. at 416.
126 Id. at 415.
, E.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887); Transportation Co. v. City
of Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878). See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165, 1184 (1967).
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pensation clause. The most prominent exception to this
pattern is Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,128 in
which Bankruptcy Act amendments that deprived morta-
gagees of their right to foreclose were held to effect a tak-
ing of property without compensation. As one
commentator has pointed out, however, the choice be-
tween the due process and just compensation clauses in
Radford seems largely one of semantics, since the majority
opinion cites no takings cases and the key precedents
were contract clause and due process clause cases. 129
Since the Radford case, the Court has treated the issue
presented by legislative retrospectivity as one of due pro-
cess. In Turner Elkhorn and R.A. Gray, the two most recent
such cases, neither the parties nor the Court considered
the just compensation clause arguments against the stat-
utes in question, although takings arguments were ad-
vanced by two amici in R.A. Gray.' 30
It is striking how congruent a traditional takings analy-
sis is with the due process analysis of retrospective legisla-
128 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
129 Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of
the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 973, 1023 (1983). Although it is largely unimportant under which clause a
retrospective statute is upheld, it may be significant whether a statute is invali-
dated under the due process or the just compensation clause. If it is the latter, the
property owner may be entitled to damages for the "interim taking" of its prop-
erty interest. See San Deigo Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego,. 450 U.S. 621, 653-60
(1981) (Brennan, Stewart, Marshall & Powell, JJ. dissenting). This approach
raises a number of problems. If the Supreme Court held that retrospective appli-
cation of a statute that purported to bar a cause of action was unconstitutional and
that dismissal of plaintiffs claim by the district court constituted an interim taking,
would damages be awarded for the erroneous dismissal? If the court of appeals
affirmed the dismissal the period of time during which plaintiffs claim had been
"taken" would presumably start with the dismissal and end either with the
Supreme Court's reversal or recommencement of the proceedings on remand.
But what if the court of appeals reversed the district court's judgment and the
defendant sought review in the Supreme Court? From the plaintiff's point of
view, the delay is the same in either case. If the same level of damages is awarded
in both cases, it suggests that just compensation is required any time a claim is
wrongfully dismissed, even if the ground for dismissal is not an unconstitutional
statute.
,SO See Brief for National American Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n at 11-12, Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 104 S. Ct. 2709 (1984); Brief for Trans-
port Motor Express, Inc., et al., same case.
834 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [50
tion. Both clauses require a determination whether equity
and justice permit a private party to bear the loss or de-
struction of value of his or her property due to govern-
ment action. 13 1 Similarly, the various factors the Supreme
Court relied on in its takings cases all find a counterpart
in the substantive due process analysis described in Part
III. A. of this article. These factors include: the degree of
interference with the reasonable expectations of the indi-
vidual;5 2 the character of the governmental action;1 33 the
relationsfip between the regulation and the substantial
public p,.rpose sought to be furthered; 134 the oppressive-
ness of lie means chosen; 3 5 and the balance of equities,
i.e., harm to the individual and benefit to the public. 136
The factors in both instances seek to tell the Court
whether the settled expectations of private parties are
such (reasonable and investment backed? vested? tradi-
tionally subject to "adjustment" by. the legislature?) that
governments should not be able freely to interfere with
them.
The difference between the two clauses is largely in the
direction they take after the Court has concluded that the
legislature has "gone too far" by impermissibly altering
expectations retrospectively. 3 7 The due process clause
simply limits the legislation to prospective effect, while
1 Compare, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 104 S. Ct.
2704, 2720 (1984) (due process standard may be offended if retrospective legisla-
tion is "particularly harsh and oppressive"), with Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) (takings analysis permits uncompensated
injury to private property interests if permitted by "justice and fairness"), and
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (same).
132 E.g. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn. Central
Transp. Co. v. United States, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
" E.g., Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175-76; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127-28.
- Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.
' E.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962).
136 See generally Michelman, supra note 127, at 1193-96. The congruence of the
two property clauses was illustrated recently in United States v. Locke, 105 S. Ct.
1785 (1985), in which the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute that divested
owners of their title to "stale mining claims." Although the challenge was
grounded in the just compensation clause, the Court's opinion on that issue was
liberally interspersed with references to due process cases. See id. at 1797-1801.
1' See Rogers, supra note 129, at 1022.
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the just compensation clause permits the retrospectivity
but requires that the private party be compensated for its
losses. Limiting the Act to prospective operation, how-
ever, is the economic equivalent of ordering the federal
government to pay just compensation because, in either
event, the antitrust plaintiff is left with its claim for dam-
ages or the money equivalent.1 3 8 Thus, even this "differ-
ence" between the two clauses can be viewed, at a certain
level of generality, as similar means to an identical end:
the amelioration of unduly harsh and oppressive retro-
spective legislation. 1 39
When viewed in this manner, the constitutional analysis
of the Act's retrospectivity is the same under both the due
process and just compensation clauses. The reasons why
the Act is not unconstitutional on due process grounds
explain its validity under the just compensation clause as
well. Contrary to the suggestion of the Symms memoran-
dum, an affected antitrust plaintiff should have no takings
claim against the United States for the loss of its damage
claim, any more than the Act should be limited to a pro-
spective application to claims for damages that accrued af-
ter the statute became law.
1s This statement, while generally true, glosses over two differences in the out-
come under the two clauses. As already noted, the just compensation clause may
require the payment of compensation for the "interim taking" of the antitrust
plaintiff's claim for damages as well as for the claim itself. See supra note 129. In
addition, where the retrospective abolition of a cause of action is legislated by one
sovereign (the federal government in the case of the Act), and the underlying
claim is against a different entity (e.g., a local government), the economic burden
will fall on different parties depending upon which clause is used to invalidate the
legislation. Thus, the choice between the due process and just compensation
clauses requires a policy choice as to which entity should pay to make the plaintiff
whole: the local government defendants (and their taxpayers) or the federal gov-
ernment (and its taxpayers).
-1' See Rogers, supra note 129, at 1022-23.
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